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ABSTRACT
This article looks into Armenia’s and Belarus’ engagement with the
European Union’s (EU) and Russia’s conditionalities, the two EU
Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries that are also members of the
Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). While paying
attention to political, economic (including energy and technical)
as well as security dimensions of the EU’s and Russia’s
approaches, as proposed in the present special section, the article
demonstrates that the conditionalities extended by the EU and
Russia to the two countries in question have differed. In their turn,
Armenia and Belarus have reacted differently to Russia’s and the
EU’s conditionalities. Against the backdrop of the changing
significance ascribed to both the EU’s and Russia’s policies
towards their common neighbourhood since the 1990s, the
present contribution identifies and analyses factors that account
for the diverging positions of Armenia and Belarus, including the
type of regime, the geopolitical considerations, the stakes in the
economic and energy spheres and the predisposition to
integration. The article shows that in the resulting complex
context, Armenia and Belarus have been able to influence the
shape and content of the EU’s and Russia’s conditionalities,








Within the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood comprising six countries in the post-Soviet area,
namely, the geographically defined Eastern European Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and
the South Caucasian Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia and Belarus stand out
due to their close relations with Russia.1 These are the only two European Union’s (EU)
Eastern Partnership (EaP) states that are also part of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic
Union (EAEU). While Armenia and Belarus differ in terms of reasons, nature and objectives
of their relationship with Moscow, they share a similarity of close security ties, as well as
economic and energy dependency on Russia.2 This common feature sets the tone for
Armenia’s and Belarus’ engagement with the EU, while also raising the question of how
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much of EU conditionality, and of what kind, could be absorbed by countries in such a pos-
ition. The issue is intriguing since Armenia’s and Belarus’ close relationship with Moscow
has not precluded their cooperation with the EU, as reflected in their participation in the
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EaP, albeit to a different extent.3
In the dynamically evolving field of the EU external governance and the ENP/EaP
studies, single-case studies of Armenia (Delcour, 2017; Vasilyan, 2017) and Belarus
(Bosse, 2012; Korosteleva, 2013) have been already carried out. While there is also a
smaller number of contributions exploring EU’s and Russia’s influence on each of the
two individual countries (Delcour, 2017; Vasilyan, 2017; Vasilyan & Petrossian, 2014),
these studies have not specifically focused on the reception of Russia’s versus EU’s con-
ditional approaches in Belarus and Armenia. In addition, a comparative analysis of
Armenia and Belarus has been rare (cf Dragneva, Delcour, & Jonavicius, 2017).
By firstly assessing the policies of Russia and the EU towards their shared neighbour-
hood and, secondly evaluating their respective reception in Armenia and Belarus the
article carries out a double comparison. It allows to demonstrate that, on the one hand,
the conditionalities imposed by the EU and Russia towards the two countries have dif-
fered. On the other hand, it shows that Armenia and Belarus have reacted to Russia’s
and the EU’s conditional approaches in a different way, something reflected in the fact
that only Armenia and not Belarus signed an advanced agreement with the EU, the Com-
prehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA), in November 2017. This diver-
gent pattern of conditionality reception in two EaP countries urges for exploration of
factors responsible for it on the part of the individual EaP states, which is especially
crucial in light of the 2015 revision of the ENP and the ensuing EU aspirations to
develop a more differentiated and flexible set of policy tools towards its neighbours.
This article starts with a short account of the EU’s and Russia’s conditional approaches
towards the two countries that serves to establish turning points in their changing pos-
itions towards the common neighbourhood. While tracing the evolution of EU engage-
ment with its neighbours towards its most recent expression in the Association
Agreements (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), it also investi-
gates the Russian foreign policy shift away from the affinity-based and towards a pragma-
tism-oriented position. It finally looks into the role played by the EAEU, developed initially
as the Eurasian Customs Union (EACU), but nevertheless displaying ambition to become a
full-fledged Eurasian Union. The reaction of two EaP states is then analysed by applying
analytical framework proposed in the introduction to this special section, in addition to
identifying further factors relevant to the reception of the EU and Russian policies in
Armenia and Belarus in specific policy areas.
EU’s and Russia’s policies towards shared neighbourhood: the legacy of
two decades
Both the EU and Russia have been faced with the dilemma of how to define a new
approach towards their common neighbourhood following the dissolution of the Soviet
Union. The EU’s initial stance in the beginning of the 1990s has been mostly oriented
towards finding a mode of cooperation with Russia, with the EU’s Eastward enlargement
occupying most of the place on the political agenda. Russia’s own position set the
premium on the cooperation within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
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extending advanced cooperation in military (industrial) field, as well as in the areas of edu-
cation and culture, and the movement of people (labour) to Russia in addition to trade and
financial assistance, to its most eager members. Russia’s emerging policy towards its ‘near
abroad’ was based upon socio-cultural affinity rather than conditionality, aiming at culti-
vating a ‘collective we’ with these states without, however, stipulating a clearly defined
set of cooperation conditions and rewards. Such affinity-based engagement allowed for
flexibility in dealing with pressing bilateral problems, as reflected in the intricate Russia-
Belarus barter schemes to resolve pressing energy debt issues (Balmaceda, 2014). Along
with social, economic and political ties, Russia’s privileged position in terms of influencing
its neighbours had a strong cultural and linguistic dimension, with the Russian language as
a lingua franca facilitating the relations. A factor especially relevant to fostering bilateral
relations was the presence of the Russian media, as most of Russian TV and radio channels
had been widely broadcasting both in Belarus and Armenia. Multiple ways were therefore
available to convey Russian narratives as an integral part of its ‘soft power’ influence in its
‘near abroad’. The EU hardly enjoyed a similar tool of projection of its image or influence in
the region at that time. However, while being aware of its advantage over the EU in terms
of influence over its ‘near abroad’, Moscow was not interested to capitalise upon it: the
EU’s incipient policy towards CIS states was not viewed as a threat to what Russia has con-
sidered its traditional zone of influence (cf Schmidt-Felzmann, 2016).
In the initial phase of the evolution of EU’s and Russia’s policies towards the post-Soviet
states, as the EU was channelling its Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States (TACIS) programme, starting from 1991 onwards,4 there was no overlap
between the EU’s and Russia’s approaches towards their neighbours. Originally, TACIS
comprised humanitarian and technical assistance provided unconditionally to CIS
countries (Vasilyan, 2006), and it was only in the TACIS regulation adopted in 1996 that
the EU referred to negative conditionality, by stipulating ‘the possibility of suspending
an assistance… in cases of violation of democratic principles and human rights’ (European
Commission, n.d.). The associated ‘Western template’ for reforms in different spheres, was
not contested by Moscow. More generally, TACIS aimed to help CIS countries, including
Russia, revive infrastructurally, economically and politically after the demise of the
Soviet Union. In this spirit, EU initiatives like the additional Transport Corridor Europe-Cau-
casus-Asia (TRACECA) and Inter-State Oil and Gas Transportation to Europe (INOGATE) also
targeted the whole former Soviet space with the objective of creating a transportation and
energy hub stretching from the EU to the Newly Independent States (NIS) (Vasilyan, 2006).
Meanwhile, since the 1990s, the EU and its member states have stood out as zealous
democracy promoters in the eastern part of its neighbourhood channelling funding
both through state and non-state actors (Vasilyan, 2010c). For the latter the European
(Initiative later to be renamed into) Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
(EIDHR), Non-State Actors and Local Authorities (NSA&LA), Decentralised Cooperation
have served as relevant budget lines. Recently these have been augmented by the
funding provided directly to non-state actors by the European Endowment for Democracy
(EED).5 Armenia has been one of the beneficiaries of such funding with the adoption of
‘soft norms’ taking place at the bottom (Vasilyan, 2010c).
However, even in this initial stage of interaction, in stark contrast to converging views in
Moscow and the West on the course of Russia’s and CIS states’ internal political and econ-
omic reforms, tensions emerged between the parties in the area of conflict resolution,
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especially in the post-Soviet space. For instance, in the case of the resolution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the frames of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group,6 frictions surfaced between Russia and
Sweden as co-chairs over choice of venue or differing initiatives in the mid-1990s (De
Waal, 2003).7
The adoption, conclusion and ratification of the first PCAs between 1994 and 1996
marked an important turning point in the evolution of the EU conditionality towards
the post-Soviet countries. The PCAs established the so-called ‘suspension clauses’ as
well as ‘evolutionary clauses’ paving the way to a FTA in the future (Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus and Moldova),8 thereby reinforcing the role of the (positive and negative) EU con-
ditionality in promoting reforms. Its subsequent application has not always been consist-
ent, however, as manifest in negative political conditionality (i.e. sanctions) applied to
Belarus,9 which stood in contrast to exclusively positive conditionality extended to
Armenia. As for Russia, its approach towards CIS countries, continued to be affinity-
based, informal, and was developed on an ad hoc basis, with specific benefits for the
cooperation-oriented partners defined individually for every bilateral relationship, and
often subject to (re)negotiation. The reinforcement of a ‘collective we’ towards the post-
Soviet states continued to be the main rationale of Russia’s engagement, as manifest in
Gazprom’s pricing policy for Russian natural gas export to individual neighbouring
countries (Balmaceda, 2014).10
The years 2000 introduced a turn in EU-Russian relations and a rethinking, on the part of
Russia, of the EU/Western recommendations as a blueprint for Russia’s reforms (Schmidt-
Felzmann, 2016). NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the subsequent recognition of
independence by the US and a majority of EU member-states created a new political
context for conflict-resolution efforts in Chechnya, as well as Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. NATO enlargement to Central Eastern European countries
between 1996 and 2004 was making pro-Western oriented Georgia after its Rose Revolu-
tion (2003) and Ukraine after its Orange Revolution (2004) hopeful of their accession bid,
while simultaneously raising the wariness of Moscow (Vasilyan, 2010b). Negotiations over
consequences of the EU enlargement for Russia, which included the issue of Kaliningrad
transit and trade aversion, demonstrated a clash of interests between Russia and the
EU. All of the aforementioned changes reinforced the belief in Moscow that it could no
longer rely on the West as an agenda-setter for Russia’s reforms, so that the EU condition-
ality and EU ensuing position of policy-maker (vis-à-vis Russia as a policy-taker) were now
reconsidered in Moscow.
This new phase in EU-Russia relations went hand in hand with a rethinking of Russia’s
relations towards the CIS countries. A ‘pragmatisation’ of Russian foreign policy was
announced by Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov in 2001 (Vieira, 2016),
with Russia now putting its foreign policy to the service of its own (economic) develop-
ment, thereby abstaining from the previous practice of subsidising its (south-)eastern
neighbours. In the mid-2000s, Gazprom’s pricing policy towards the ‘near abroad’
changed radically, and Gazprom came to gradually acquire gas and oil transmission net-
works in Moldova, Belarus and Armenia (Babayan, 2015). Russia’s affinity-based approach
originally aimed at fostering a ‘collective we’ was now giving place to a new style of inter-
action, with Russia’s own interests coming fist. However, it continued to lack any clear set
of conditions for Russia’s CIS partners’ compliance.
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Faced with the need to find new, more effective cooperation modes with its politically
defined neighbours following its eastward enlargement, the EU launched the ENP in 2003–
2004. This new EU policy was founded upon positive political conditionality, with the pro-
spect of the ‘EU internal market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the
free movement of persons, goods, services and capital (four freedoms)’ (European Com-
mission, 2003). Following the ENP review in response to the Arab Spring, the EU intro-
duced the so-called ‘more for more’ principle in 2011, stipulating a closer relationship
with neighbours displaying a more advanced reform progress. This resulted in additional
funding for Armenia (together with Georgia and Moldova) owing to the country’s good
performance as assessed by the EU in 2012 and 2013 (Vasilyan, 2018).11 While Belarus
remained outside the ENP, EU’s relations with Armenia had been codified in the EU-
Armenia Action Plan (AP), a political document building upon the legal PCA foundation
and listing the ‘priorities for action’ in all the domains of public life (Ibid.).
The ENP aimed at the introduction of ‘partial’ positive conditionality (Vasilyan, 2010a),
implying incremental provision of additional funding, extension of projects and budget
lines, access to programmes and agencies short of the membership ‘carrot’. However, it
has been often criticised for inconsistency, including at the point of the acceptance into
this policy of Armenia and Azerbaijan in following Georgia’s Rose Revolution, in spite of
the lack of democratic progress in the two countries (Babayan, 2015). The positive condi-
tionality approach underpinning the ENP, which was additionally reinforced in the ‘more
for more’ principle, has been actively debated in the expert community. Hale (2012) rec-
ommended to pursue the ‘more-for-less’ principle for rendering influence over authoritar-
ian states, such as Azerbaijan. For the sake of proportionality it has been suggested to offer
least for most, e.g. Georgia, less for more, e.g. Armenia, and most for least, e.g. Azerbaijan
(Vasilyan, 2010c). In addition, while the main aspiration of the AP was to reinforce the EU
conditionality, uncertainty regarding specific conditions and rewards for neighbour states’
compliance was recognised as a weak point (Delcour, 2017).
As the ENP introduced the logic of ‘competition for reforms’, with ‘frontrunners’ and
laggards among six EaP states identified in every monitoring phase, all six of them politi-
cally, economically and culturally close to Russia, EU’s policy and the reform efforts of the
former Soviet states started to be closely followed in Moscow. In response and building
upon pragmatism as a new principle of Russia’s foreign policy, Moscow started to
employ its own-styled negative functional conditionality, by calling upon the established
linkage(s) with its neighbours, which eventually led to (re)appearance of a number of sec-
toral ‘trade wars’ (over milk, meat, wine, energy, etc) (Korosteleva, 2013; cf Samokhvalov,
2016). Russia’s approach stood in stark contrast with the ENP offer underpinned by posi-
tive conditionality, a contrast further reinforced by the Russia-Georgia war over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia in 2008, which attested to Russia’s capacity to resort to military
measures vis-à-vis the states in its ‘near abroad’. In 2009, responding to the new Russian
assertiveness as well as to the growing concerns of the Russia’s neighbours, the EU
launched the EaP establishing the prospect of further political association, economic inte-
gration and legal convergence between the EU and the six participating states. The orig-
inal Polish-Swedish idea of a special relationship between the EU and the countries to its
East eventually assumed the contours of AA and a DCFTA, in addition to the focus on mul-
tilateral cooperation (Vasilyan, 2010a).
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Russia’s subsequent position can be characterised as further consolidation of Russia’s
ad-hoc negative functional conditionality. One of its manifestations was recurrent trade
conflicts with both EU-oriented countries such as Ukraine and pro-Russian states (Koroste-
leva, 2013). Heads of Russia’s food safety agency (Rosselkhoznadzor) as well as consumer
protection agencies (Rospotrebnadzor) became faces and voices of Russia’s unpredictable
trade conflicts with Russia’s neighbours. Internal administrative adjustments reflected the
new importance of the agencies: in 2012, Rosselhosnadzor was made directly responsible
to the federal government, in contrast to its previous subordinated position at the ministry
of health (Black, 2015, p. 110).
The revamp of the Eurasian project, in the form of the EACU and afterwards the EAEU
(and potentially the Eurasian Union) offered another response to the evolving EaP, which
demonstrated the double-track nature of Russian engagement. On the one hand, Moscow
indicated that it had developed its own negative functional conditionality, with an associ-
ated package of ‘sticks’ and ‘carrots’ now extended to the prospective members/outsiders
of the Eurasian project. The case in point were the sensitive Russia-Belarus gas trans-
mission network negotiations eventually leading to what has become known as an ‘inte-
gration discount’, of the price of natural gas in return for Belarus’ participation in the
Eurasian project (Vieira, 2017).12
On the other hand, Moscow demonstrated willingness to supplement its previous ad
hoc approach towards its ‘near abroad’ with an institutionalised basis for the relations.
In stark contrast with the previous integration initiatives on the post-Soviet space,
where the cooperation was primarily grounded in Russia’s aspiration to cultivate the ‘col-
lective we’ on the basis of informal trade-offs, EACU/EAEU cooperation included an actual
implementation of the institutionalised and legalised norms. For instance, the EACU
became de facto operational very fast, introducing new legislation in a number of fields
(Delcour & Wolczuk, 2014). This created new terms of engagement with Russia for its Eur-
asian partners such as Belarus and Armenia.
By the moment of EAEU’s entrance into force in 2015, in light of the rapidly evolving
events in Ukraine, the Eurasian integration had been experiencing a setback (Vieira,
2016). Russia’s actions in Ukraine demonstrated that Russia was determined to resist uni-
lateral application of the EU conditionality in the EaP countries. At the same time, Russia’s
Eurasian partners were now more cautious in taking steps towards deepening integration,
while also raising questions on Russia’s overall integration commitment and objectives. A
linear evolution of the Eurasian initiative was no longer a viable plan, as the parties have in
fact regressed in terms of their integration efforts in a number of fields. This has not only
led to sporadic setbacks in trade and economic matters (such as the occasional milk and
meat ‘wars’ between Russia and Belarus); in 2016 and 2017, checkpoints have been intro-
duced between the two EAEU member states, undermining the common custom space
while also indicating Belarus’ resistance to the Russian functional conditionality (Vieira,
2016). All these events eventually raised new questions on the mechanisms and dynamics
of the Eurasian integration process, once again bringing to the forefront the issue of the
Russian (and the EU) conditional approaches.
The EU in its turn recognised the need to develop a more differentiated approach
towards its neighbours, including by rethinking its engagement with the EaP countries
also participating in the EAEU, thus paving the way towards EU-Armenia CEPA as a new
precedent formalising the EU-EaP states relationship. However, Russia continued to
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insist on the right to interpret the extent of compatibility between two integration blocs
(Dragneva et al., 2017, p. 16).
The EU, Russia and Armenia: policies with loose strings
The case of Armenia illustrates a vivid difference of perception of the EU and Russia as
influential external actors. The Armenian elite, political parties and the public have per-
ceived the EU as a political and economic bloc, with Russia and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) considered as vital security partners (Vasilyan, 2011). The
Armenian National Security Strategy has appreciated cooperation with all the possible
global and regional actors, yet, naming only Russia as a ‘strategic’ ally (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, 2007, in Vasilyan & Petrossian, 2014). This
can be attributed to the fact that, as a result of the Armenian Genocide under the
Ottoman Empire, Russia per se has been viewed as a saviour and the subsequently estab-
lished Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR) as a safe haven, which entitled Armenians
to statehood.13 The EU and its member states, including France, Germany, the UK and Italy,
along with the US have thus been new-comers to a region previously subject to imperial
incursions by the regional powers, especially Russia, Turkey and Iran as successors of the
Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires. In the face of the lingering Nagorno-Karabakh con-
flict as a domestic and foreign policy priority, and in its condition of a small state, Armenia
has been keen to navigate in the ‘known terrain’ configured by conventional relations with
states rather than recent international actors with cumbersome bureaucratic machinery
such as the EU. However, the country has also welcomed EU’s programmes, projects
and initiatives (contrary to other states, such as Belarus).
While the official discourse recognises the country as ‘European’, Armenia’s nation- and
state-building is to be attributed to the Soviet period. At the same time, the size of its dia-
spora has made the Armenian identity multi-layered, branched among the American,
European, Eurasian, North-American, and Middle Eastern ones. With the largest Armenian
communities residing in Russia, the US and France in the mentioned order, and thereby
representing important constituencies and interest groups in the respective countries,
the Armenian government sought cooperation with all (Vasilyan, 2011).14 This led to
facing the differential conditionalities of the EU and Russia tied to their political identities,
as assumed in the approach adopted in the present special section. Therefore, even with
consideration of the historical ties and contemporary political context, no exclusive recep-
tion of Russia’s versus the EU conditionality has been taking place.
In comparison to the enlargement policy currently exercised towards the (potential)
candidate countries, especially in the Western Balkans with embedded negative condition-
ality, and in contrast to EU sanctions against Belarus, the EU has only applied positive con-
ditionality towards the South Caucasian countries, including Armenia (Vasilyan, 2018).
Despite being classified as ‘partial democracy’ (Freedom House, 2016) due to its electoral
malpractices, Armenia was able to benefit from the good disposition of the EU, who had
been inclined to reward the apprenticeship of better democratic practices.15 Meanwhile,
Russia had not imposed any negative conditionality on Armenia either. An episode of
an application of functional EU conditionality can be considered the Mobility Partnership
Agreement with Armenia (2011), when the EU has attached the repatriation of illegal
migrants as a condition for offering visa facilitation and especially potential visa
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liberalisation for temporary migration. Eventually, the Visa Facilitation Agreement signed
in 2012 and the Readmission Agreement signed in 2013, entered into force at the same
time in January 2014. In contrast, the Russian Compatriots Programme as of 2009 had pro-
vided an unconditional offer for permanent labour immigration, something that had been
facilitated by demographic shifts in the Russian aging population (Vasilyan, 2017; Vasilyan
& Petrossian, 2014).16
Meanwhile, domestic acceptance/resistance to the policies of the EU and Russia can be
illustrated by internal political dynamics. The country has witnessed a number of public
rallies over the past few years.17 The case in point are protests in Yerevan in September
2013, that even though of a less magnitude than the Euromaidan in Ukraine, nevertheless
united hundreds in front of the presidential residence following the presidential
announcement regarding the country’s change of foreign policy course (Grigoryan,
2013). Different from the colour revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, Armenia’s
civic activism at the bottom has been frequent, and aimed at revealing the malpractices in
domestic economic, social and political governance. With Russia involved in the country
via the assets it holds in Armenia’s energy (electricity and gas) and transportation net-
works, in addition to banking, insurance and telecommunications, and considering
Russia’s share of foreign direct investment (FDI) and its role as the second trade partner
(after the EU), as well as security ally with a military base in Armenia’s second largest
town Gyumri, Moscow had been a target of some civic protests, either directly or indirectly
(Vasilyan, 2017; Vasilyan & Petrossian, 2014).
In the energy sphere, in spite of the public protests, Gazprom gained complete control
over Armenia’s gas distribution network in December 2013. As a result of the subsequent
protests against mismanagement and corruption following the electricity price hike in
June 2015, the gas price offered to Armenia was lowered to 165 USD per thousand
cubic metres in September the same year (Radio Free Liberty, Radio Europe, 2015, in Vasil-
yan, 2017) making Armenia the top beneficiary ahead of Belarus (Vasilyan, 2017). Further,
in April 2016 it was dropped to 150 USD (Arka News Agency, 2016). The Electric Networks
of Armenia (ENA) acquired by RAO UES in 2006 was sold to the Tashir Group owned by a
Russian-Armenian billionaire in mid-2015, something that allowed the Armenian govern-
ment to make a pledge to subsidise the expenditures up to 31 July 2016, switching to com-
pensation of families living below the poverty line as of August 2016. Unlike Georgia, who
is a member to the Energy Charter Treaty promoted by the EU, Armenia is an observer
(Vasilyan, 2018). In short, in the energy domain, the relevant interests have determined
the reception of EU and Russian conditionality.
In the security sphere, Russia has been Armenia’s primary ally. This ‘bandwagoning’
exercise has been juxtaposed to the Azerbaijan-Turkey and US-Georgia alliances. In the
meantime, Armenia (although not a formal party) and Azerbaijan, which/who has recur-
rently threatened with the use of force, have pursued an arms-race resulting in escalation
in the context of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Vasilyan, 2010b). The EU has not provided
conflict-resolution focused assistance to Armenia or Azerbaijan through the National
Indicative Programs (NIPs), the programming instruments under the ENP, distributing its
funding proportionally among different domains instead. The August 2008 war over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia reaffirmed Russia’s leading position as a mediator via the
Maindorf Declaration in the presence of Russian, Armenian and Azeri Presidents (Vasilyan,
2013). However, Armenian public’s hopes that Russia’s recognition of the independence of
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Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be followed by Moscow’s identical posture vis-à-vis
Nagorno-Karabakh, remained unfulfilled. Russia’s role as a major mediator was neverthe-
less reinstated in the aftermath of the April 2016 war launched by Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh, with Russia convening a meeting in Moscow with the presence of
the Iranian Foreign Minister.18 Having tried to maintain ‘parity’ between Armenia and Azer-
baijan, Russia has provided weaponry (for free or at discounted rates) to the former and
sold to the latter (Kucera, 2015). In the meantime, up to 2013, Armenia aligned with
more CFSP declarations issued by the EU than the neighbouring Azerbaijan or even
Georgia (Vasilyan, 2018). Yet, Armenia’s economic condition and the security environment
have a priori made it susceptible to accepting Russia’s potential conditionality.
The constitutional amendments following the 2015 referendum were approved by the
CIS observers, with the EU delegation ‘calling for investigations’ amidst allegations of fraud
(ArmeniaNow 2015 and Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Armenia
2015 in Vasilyan, 2017). The envisaged transition from the presidential to a parliamentary
type of regime in circumstances when the incumbent president was heading the majority
Republican Party has raised suspicions regarding the intention of the latter to find a covert
tactic for keeping on to power (Ibid.). The envisaged signing of the AA had raised public
expectations over potential amelioration of the political climate via improvement of elec-
toral practices, human rights and governance, so that the retreat from these principles has
led to public disenchantment. At the same time, while Armenia has been lagging behind
other EaP countries such as Georgia and Moldova in terms of the overall democracy score,
in the EAEU it still fares best, both politically, despite the stagnation since 2013 (Freedom
House, 2016) and as a relatively more liberal economy (Vasilyan, 2017). Without any reform
incentive from the top, and democracy not being a criterion for accession into the EAEU,
‘(b)lockage’ of transition to democracy has been taking place in the past few years (Vasil-
yan, 2016). As a result of retreat from the path of closer ‘integration with’ the EU (Vasilyan,
2017), Armenia has experienced stagnation of the reform-prone stamina.
The turning point marked by the shift of Armenia’s foreign policy choice towards enter-
ing the EACU in 2013 and eventually becoming a member of the EAEU in 2015 was not
accompanied by formal negative conditionality on the part of the EU or positive condition-
ality by Russia. While the visit by President Sargsyan to Moscow at the brink of his declara-
tion regarding the change of Armenia’s foreign policy course led to public reflections on a
possible push by President Putin, the Armenian leadership has denied any pressure
exerted by Moscow. Rather, the preference for the EACU/EAEU was justified on security
grounds, in the sense that Armenia’s membership in the CSTO presupposed conformity
with its participation in a regional economic grouping that had a similar member-state
composition (Vasilyan, 2017).
Meanwhile, the accession to the EACU did not go smoothly. Due to Azerbaijan’s lobby-
ing, Kazakhstan and Belarus objected to Armenia’s membership, expressing reluctance to
see the potential extension of the EACU to Nagorno-Karabakh, which does not have a
customs checkpoint with Armenia. This was resolved with the Russian statement articu-
lated by the Head of the Eurasian Economic Commission Viktor Khristenko that an external
country could not determine matters pertaining to a regional bloc, implying that
Armenia’s membership would take place against all odds (Asbarez, 2013). This implied
that Russia preferred to keep the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict de-securitised in the EAEU
framework. Moreover, the Armenian bureaucrats had to de-learn what they had
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apprehended from the European counterparts in the process of approximation to the
rules, standards and practices with the EU and learn what was put forth by the EAEU col-
leagues (Vasilyan, 2017). This has led to complications in functional adaptation through
‘hard norms’, despite the political determination to proceed. Additionally, while Belarus
as a founding member could have a say over the nature of the EACU and the EAEU
being a norm-setter together with Russia and Kazakhstan, Armenia, together with Kyrgyz-
stan were late-comers, thereby becoming norm-takers.
Paradoxically, Armenia had become a front-runner in terms of adoption of the required
EU legislation in line with the necessary positive functional conditionality, with a best
record of approximation to the EU acquis by adoption of hard norms in addition to soft
norms. Given the fact that the Armenian government’s position indicated that the relation-
ship with the EU constituted a priority, the pre-Vilnius summit declaration by President
Sargsyan was met with disappointment in Brussels. However, the EU expressed respect
for the partner’s choice (Panarmenian.Net, 2013). The already negotiated AA and the
DCFTA had to be abandoned and a new unprecedented type of a document was to be
developed, eventually taking the shape of the CEPA. The EU therefore did not hesitate
to continue with sectoral cooperation with Armenia in those spheres of interest
whereby no clash between Armenia’s relations with the EU and membership obligations
in the EAEU would be detected. These ranged from reform of the justice sector, public
administration, private sector to engagement with civil society. The sectoral cooperation
was accompanied by a funding scheme, the Single Support Framework, which replaced
the NIP, yet again devoid of any negative conditionality (Vasilyan, 2018).
The tacit levers which Russia may have utilised vis-à-vis Armenia in September 2013
draw on the above-mentioned stakes. Moreover, the entwinement between the Armenian
and Russian elites allows inferring that any informal reference by the Russian leadership to
these issues would have made the Armenian authorities comply with a Russia-favoured
policy choice. While previously Armenia had managed to oscillate between Russia and
the EU, the decision on accession to the EAEU had reshaped Armenia’s former ‘comp-
lementary’ foreign policy into a ‘supplementary’ one, i.e. with unequal weight in foreign
policy now distributed in favour of Russia and the EACU/EAEU with the relevant domestic
repercussions (Vasilyan, 2014). In the meantime, Armenian political actors and the public
watched the Maidan from a distance, wary of any radical change potentially leading to a
crisis. Albeit having retained stability, public distrust in the political processes grew in
Armenia, irrespective as to whether these have been tilted towards the EU, which is associ-
ated with scepticism qua the values, especially, minority rights it intends to transpose, or
Russia qua loss of sovereignty-related concerns (Vasilyan, 2011).
The EU, Russia and Belarus: conditional approaches in a zero-sum game?
At first approximation, Belarus represents a clear case of acceptance of Russia’s and the
rejection of the EU’s conditional approaches. Since the mid-1990s, Russia’s policies have
been viewed as appropriate and even legitimate in Belarus, while the EU conditionality
rejected along with other Western approaches, proposals and offers. The EU and the
West were determined to apply negative normative conditionality on the increasingly
authoritarian Belarusian regime since the mid-1990s. Brussels came to adopt ‘one of the
most complete CFSP sanctions regimes in force’, in addition to reducing the political
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dialogue and the interaction with the Belarusian authorities (but not the opposition or civil
society) to its minimum, which included the suspension of the PCA (Bosse, 2012, p. 374;
Portela, 2011, p. 487).19 Both internally and in relationship with Moscow, Belarus’ confron-
tation with the West had featured as an important factor in improving the position of
Belarusian leadership. Under these circumstances, the EU political conditionality had
become ‘unacceptable in principle’ (Rontoyanni & Korosteleva, 2005, p. 217). Policies
and offers coming from Moscow, on the contrary, were met positively, independent of
whether they were associated with hard or soft norms. In this sense, the Belarusian leader-
ship came to support all Russia-led regional initiatives, such as CIS, CSTO and the Eurasian
project. Belarus’ reaction to EU’s and Russia’s conditional approaches resembled the logic
of a zero-sum game, in which the choice for embracing Russia’s conditional approaches
was embedded into an affinity-based relationship with Moscow, while rejecting the con-
ditionality of the EU served to reaffirm Belarus’ explicit denial of any EU potential to exert
its influence. It is in this sense that the nature of Russia and the EU as actors with two differ-
ent political identities can be argued to determine Belarus’ reception of Russia’s and the
rejection of EU conditionality.
This account of a decade of Belarus’ limited contact with the West, however, needs to
be reconsidered in light of the evolving Russian and EU approaches. Starting from the mid-
2000s, the acceptance of Russian conditional offers and initiatives had become much less
‘commonsensical’ in Belarus, as manifest in growing bilateral disagreements between the
two closest allies, including recurrent trade wars, Belarus’ de-alignment from Russia in
the matters of recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as cooperation within
the CSTO (Busygina, 2018 ). Meanwhile, EU recognised that the effects of its negative nor-
mative conditionality in Belarus had been limited, which eventually paved the way to the
EU’ engagement with the country in the late 2000s, the opening of the European Commis-
sion’s Delegation in Minsk, Belarus acceptance to the EaP (multilateral dimension), and the
launch of functional cooperation. The latter has included ‘structured discussions’ on
energy (Portela, 2011, p. 494), and some years later, visa facilitation talks and the European
Dialogue on Modernisation (2012). The EU has also increased its financial support in
Belarus. Targeted sanctions have been suspended in 2008, although expanded once
again following the worsening of the political climate in Belarus in 2010 (Bosse, 2012,
p. 376; 2018). In February 2017, Belarus unilaterally introduced a visa-free regime for citi-
zens of all EU countries (for short-term visitors) (while Armenia introduced the same
measure in January 2013). In spite of the constant episodes of political downturn, the
new position assumed by the Belarusian leadership indicated that the reception of
Russia’s and EU’s conditional approaches was hardly taking place in accordance with
the logic of a zero-sum game, as one could have suggested before.
As for Russia’s conditional offers, starting from the mid-2000s, their reception, while
continuously viewed in largely positive terms in Belarus, was not any more related to
the issue of appropriateness, to the extent that the rejection of Russia’s conditionality
was not any more considered an illegitimate option. As argued elsewhere (Vieira, 2014,
2016), even Belarus’ initial wholehearted embracement of Russia’s affinity-based con-
ditional approaches has been founded upon a specific trade-off, in which Belarus’ alliance
commitments have been exchanged against economic and politico-diplomatic support of
Moscow to the Belarusian regime.20 Accordingly, Russia’s shift away from an affinity-based
position towards pragmatism led the Belarusian leadership to revise its posture towards
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Moscow (Danilovich, 2006, p. 147), even though this did not lead to a foreign policy
change commensurate with a committed reorientation towards the West.
This new Belarus perspective on Russia’s conditional approaches explains the mixed
record of Belarus’ implementation of Eurasian agreements, where the progress in terms
of adoption and implementation of the agreed arrangements has coincided with a
growing number of trade conflicts between Russia and Belarus, including over industrial
machinery, milk products and meat, not to mention oil and gas issues (Korosteleva,
2013, p. 240). The unpredictable timing and the unclear reasons behind the ‘trade wars’
reinforced the belief of the Belarusian leadership that the Eurasian integration process
would remain a subject of negotiations, independent of whether it was underpinned by
soft or hard norms. Uncertainty over the course of Eurasian integration was reinforced
by Russia’s own controversial decisions, such as Russia’s proposal in 2013 to adopt sanc-
tions against Ukraine in Moldova, as a common ‘Eurasian’ measure, which eventually
was not supported by other EACU members, including Belarus (Vieira, 2016). Similarly,
Russia’s decisions on anti-sanctions against the EU and the US, taken in 2014 amid the
economic hardship and a new series of Russia-Belarus ‘trade wars’, were also not joined
by Belarusian leadership, who instead decided to revise its own commitment to the Eur-
asian integration project, eventually causing another round of bilateral trade conflicts and
introduction of border checks with Russia that were undermining the integrity of a
common customs space (Vieira, 2016, 2017).
A less straightforward position on the reception of the Russian conditionality has
however not meant acceptance of the conditionality of the EU. While the Belarusian lea-
dership had acknowledged the quality of EU norms, never questioning their credibility or
associated incentives and indeed often referring to the EU as a model in the talks within
the CSTO and CIS frameworks (Vieira, 2014), the transposition of the EU regulatory frame-
work was hardly a priority. Rather, the Belarusian leadership was eager to use the prospect
of compliance with the EU conditionality as a bargaining chip against Russia. Given the
sensitivity in Moscow to any EaP state rapprochement with the EU, which was reinforced
by the events in Ukraine, the Belarusian leadership did not need to actually implement the
EU acquis. To achieve its goals of raising stakes in the negotiation game with Moscow,
some measures indicating openness to dialogue with Brussels in the spirit of ‘functional
cooperation’ would be sufficient. In this sense, one could argue that the Belarusian
elites have been able to reaffirm their agency by identifying a certain space of manoeuvre
stemming from the conditional approaches of Russia and the EU. An additional factor facil-
itating the rapprochement between Minsk and Brussels has been the position assumed by
the Belarusian leadership on the Ukraine crisis (Busygina, 2018), which included diver-
gence from the official Moscow narrative, demonstrating a pro-Ukrainian orientation
(Vieira, 2015), as well as Belarus’ investment and engagement in the peace negotiation
process. All of this has made the traditional EU focus on sanctioning the Belarusian author-
itarian regime a less urgent matter.
As far as the adoption of soft rather than hard norms is concerned, the tendency has
been towards the adoption of the former rather than the latter. While the legal basis
(PCA), as a foundation for the potential transfer of hard norms, continues to be missing
in EU-Belarus relationship, soft norms represent a sufficiently suitable fit for the Belarusian
leadership’s objective to use the EU conditionality as an instrument in its relationship with
Moscow. In addition, opting for soft rather than hard norms in relations with the EU can be
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seen as a safer option: the events in Ukraine demonstrated how fast and how easy the
adoption of hard norms, such as AA/DCFTA, could be politicised and even securitised in
Moscow. Growing preference for the soft norms can be identified in the case of the Eur-
asian integration project as well, corresponding to the resistance to the institutionalisation
of regulatory Eurasian norms, as in the case of the roadmap towards the common currency
in the EAEU framework (Vieira, 2016). This tendency can be attributed to the aspiration of
the participating countries to leave as much room for negotiation as possible, given the
uncertainty related to Russia’s interpretation of its Eurasian commitment (Dragneva
et al., 2017, p. 10). An exception which reinforces the importance of distinguishing
between cooperation in different policy areas has been the energy issue and the prospect
of the Eurasian energy market, an especially sensitive matter to Belarus given the high
dependence of the latter on Russia’s gas and oil. In the framework of 2014–2015 EAEU
negotiations, contrary to the Russian position indicating preference to leave undefined
the establishing of short-term targets and roadmaps in the EAEU founding documents
(Vieira, 2016), Belarus insisted on the adoption of more specific provisions. The failure of
the Russian leadership to move towards harder regulation of the energy matters led the
Belarusian leadership once again to revisit its Eurasian commitment.
Finally, considering the possible role of security conditionality, Belarus as Russia’s ally,
could be expected to act upon alliance conformity. The latter could be either a result of
Russia’s exercising alliance coercion as a specific form of security conditionality (Schweller,
1994) or Belarus’ voluntary compliance in accordance with its interpretation of the alliance
obligations. Thus far however, Belarus’ alliance with Russia has not led to an unrestricted
reception of Russian conditional approaches, as already indicated above. In military-stra-
tegic terms, Belarus importance to Moscow results from its geostrategic position and
the direct border to NATO countries as well as connection to Russia’s Kaliningrad
exclave. Even though Belarus is dependent on Moscow in terms of the modernisation
of its armed forces and military equipment, this cooperation structure does not always
allow for the asymmetry necessary for Russia’s exercising alliance coercion, something
that finds confirmation in Belarus’ resistance to Russia’s plans to construct an airbase on
Belarusian territory in 2016. In addition, as indicated above, the understanding of an alli-
ance obligation in Belarus has been intertwined with political, economic, trade and energy
aspects and a possibility to (re)negotiate the terms of Russia’s conditionality. This specific
context of the reception of Russian conditional approaches in Belarus has also influenced
Belarus’ expectations within the Eurasian project, and its setbacks combined with the
instability created by the events in the neighbouring Ukraine eventually urged the Belar-
usian leadership to revise its alliance obligations towards Russia.
Conclusions
The present contribution, which aimed to provide an assessment of the reception of the
EU’s and Russia’s conditional approaches in Armenia and Belarus, allows us to draw a
number of conclusions. First of all, the EU and Russia, have both evolved in terms of
their policies towards the shared neighbourhood since the 1990s, and have become
increasingly aware of the implications and tensions provoked by their respective con-
ditional approaches. In this respect, the launch of the EaP and an offer of AA and
DCFTA, followed by the revamping of the Eurasian project, in spite of all the differences
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between the two approaches, represent important turning points in the evolution of the
EU’s and Russia’s shared neighbourhood’.
In accordance with the analytical approach adopted in the special section, the present
contribution has explored the importance of individual conditionality dimensions in the
reception of the EU and Russian conditional approaches. Regarding the role EU and
Russia as actors of different political nature and the corresponding identity dynamics in
the region, the present analysis confirms that both external actors indeed prove to be cri-
tically important to the countries in EU’s and Russia’s shared neighbourhood: both serve as
anchors for a variety of processes ranging from identity-building to economic modernis-
ation. A reflection of this is the reception in both Armenia and Belarus of at least some
(functional) conditionality from Russia and the EU. This conclusion is in tune with a
further finding concerning another conditionality dimension, namely that of security.
Here, the centrality of security cooperation in the bilateral relationship with Russia, i.e.
the formal military alliance underpinning both Russia-Armenian and Russia-Belarus
relations does not determine the reception of conditionality from just one of the two
actors (Russia) to the detriment of another (EU). A case in point is Armenia and its
advanced state of reception of the EU functional conditionality as manifest in the CEPA.
Confirmation of the importance of identity dynamics as a foundation for the reception
of EU and Russian conditional approaches comes with some qualifiers. Firstly, neither
Armenia nor Belarus have been passive receivers of the existing conditional approaches.
Secondly, while both Belarus and Armenia, just as many other EaP states, can be said to
display an internal identity split, manifest in the Europhile and Russophile orientations,
which are present in both countries, the reception of EU conditionality in the two cases
has been different. While Armenia has been able, for a long time, to absorb the EU con-
ditionality and could thus enjoy the ‘carrots’ offered by both Russia and the EU, Belarus
has been moving away from its exclusive reception of the Russian conditionality only start-
ing from the mid-2000s.
The present study also allows us to confirm receptivity towards soft norms in the recep-
tion of Russian conditional approaches. As shown in the case of Armenia, soft norms cor-
respond to Russia’s aspiration to maintain its hegemonic position resulting from its role as
a security guarantor, primary economic investor, trade partner and labour destination, as
well as a cultural trendsetter. On the other hand, the EaP states participating in the Eura-
sian project seem to rely on soft norms or at least to resist the hard norms, as a means to
avoid getting entrapped into a disadvantageous agreement with Russia (a concern that
seems to be absent from the EaP states interactions with the EU). Belarus’ position
towards the common Eurasian energy market, however, shows that hard norms can
also be seen as a guarantee of Russia’s Eurasian commitment. This proves that the struc-
ture of interests may be more important than the general tendency towards the receptive-
ness of soft rather than hard norms. More generally, the present tendency towards soft
rather than hard norms is demonstrative of the uncertainty regarding (the scope of) the
Eurasian commitment of the participating countries.
The case of Armenia provides important evidence of the EaP states’ unproblematic
acceptance of hard norms embodied in the EU conditionality. Once certain of the compat-
ibility between the offers of the two external actors, Armenia was keen on deepening
relations with the EU by pursuing the closest possible integration, most vividly represented
in the approximation to the EU acquis, without questioning any EU offer irrespective of its
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nature as a hard or soft norm and eventually embarking upon the course of substantial
reforms. The EU, in its turn, followed the progress made by the country on its way to
closer integration by offering additional funding and providing access to EU agencies
and programmes.
In addition to the analysis of individual conditionality dimensions in the reception of
Armenia and Belarus, the comparative analysis undertaken in this contribution allows
shedding light over the reasons behind both Russia and the EU recurring to practicing
negative (political) conditionality towards Belarus, while only extending positive condi-
tionality to Armenia. A more authoritarian nature of the Belarusian regime as compared
to Armenian, and its initial course of confrontation with the West provides part of the
answer, but it is as important to consider that the geopolitical proximity has made
Belarus, immediate geographical neighbours of both the EU and Russia, more relevant
to Brussels and Moscow, thereby raising the stakes and urging both external actors to
look for ways to influence the behaviour of the Belarusian leadership, with the reverse
being applicable to Armenia, which is geographically detached from both. Moreover, in
Armenia, both the EU and Russia have favoured stability through preservation of the
status quo. Negative conditionality towards Armenia might have implied shattering
the frozen Karabakh conflict, whereas Belarus does not have any security hotbed.
Finally, with Belarus acting as the energy corridor between the two foreign actors,
both have tried to exercise influence by asserting ‘power’, be it ‘normative’ of the EU
or ‘traditional’ of Russia vis-à-vis each other. Armenia being landlocked and resource-
poor, which was additionally reinforced by the fact that it had largely surrendered its
energy infrastructure to Russia, and has not received such attention by either the EU
or Russia.
These interests on the part of EU and Russia contribute to the explanation of the use
of negative conditionality towards Belarus and non-use of the latter vis-à-vis Armenia.
While both Belarus and Armenia have been reliant on both the EU and Russia as
primary trade partners, the inter-dependence with Russia has led to recurrent trade
wars in the case of Belarus, contrary to Armenia, who has evaded such tensions.
Most importantly, even if both Armenia and Belarus are members of the EAEU, the
former has entertained ‘integration with’ the EU as a foreign policy priority until the pre-
sidential declaration made in 2013. Subsequently, this has been manifested in Armenia’s
continued inclination to pursue closest possible cooperation with the EU through CEPA
in the areas, which do not collide with the obligations it has undertaken as a member of
the EAEU.
To conclude, the present contribution has once again demonstrated the need to
depart from a thinking of EU or Russian conditionalities in their common neighbour-
hood in terms of ‘competition’, or in terms of the conditionality’s (in)effectiveness on
(one of the) supply side (s). More attention should be paid to the way the conditionality
is translated into actual policy outcomes in the individual participating countries instead.
Both the cases of Belarus and Armenia demonstrate that while being caught in between
the EU and Russia, and likely to remain so due to their geographic, security and energy
characteristics, the two EaP countries participating in the EAEU have been able to
change the eventual shape and content of both the EU’s and Russia’s conditionalities
extended to them.
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Notes
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Ministry of Education and Science through national funds. The authors would like to thank the
editor and two anonymous reviewers for their time and effort leading to the present publication.
2. Russia-Belarus military alliance established by the Union Treaty (1997) has with time evolved
into a common defence system, including air defence and joint military planning (Vieira,
2014). Russia-Armenia security relations initially based on a Friendship Treaty (1997) for
mutual assistance in case of a potential military attack, allowing Russian guards to protect
Armenia’s borders with Iran and Turkey (Vasilyan, 2010b), have more recently developed
towards a joint air defence system agreement (2015) and a Joint Task Force agreement
(2016) (Vasilyan, 2018). Both Armenia and Belarus are highly dependent on the Russian
energy. In addition to the natural gas, Russia’s oil, refined and exported to the EU, generates
critical export revenue for Belarus (Balmaceda, 2014).
3. While Armenia has demonstrated aspiration to integrate more closely with the EU, coming
close to pre-signing the AA, including the DCFTA, but retreating from this foreign policy
course in 2013 (Vasilyan, 2017) and eventually signing the Comprehensive and Enhanced Part-
nership Agreement (CEPA), Belarus has only participated in the multilateral track of the EaP,
and its relations with the EU evolved without a PCA (Vieira, 2014).
4. Besides the EaP states, TACIS also covered Russia and the Central Asian countries.
5. The EED was established in 2013 replicating the US National Endowment for Democracy (Vasil-
yan, 2018).
6. The Minsk Group was a body set-up at the 1994 Budapest summit to deal with the mediation
process of this conflict.
7. Both parties displayed willingness to exert influence via agenda-setting. Eventually, although
Sweden remained a participating state of the Minsk Group, it was replaced by France as a co-
chair in 1996 (Vasilyan, 2013). Besides the co-chairing Russia, France and the United States
(US), the Minsk Group comprises Sweden, Germany, Italy, Finland, as well as Belarus and
Turkey as participating states.
8. These clauses linked upholding human rights and democracy to an increase in trade access
and deepening of relations in general, while also stipulating a unilateral suspension of the
agreement in the event of its ‘material breach’ (Bosse, 2012, p. 369; Hillion, 2000, p. 1220).
9. EU sanctions imposed on Belarus since 1996 included visa bans, freezing of assets of certain
individuals, economic sanctions on Belarusian companies, withdrawal of privileges under the
Generalised System of Preferences, in addition to limiting the political dialogue. Sanctions
never included a stoppage of the oil and/or gas flow into the EU, even ‘given the fact that
income from such sales was so critical for the Lukashenka regime’ (Balmaceda, 2014, p. 63).
10. In 2006, the difference in pricing policy for the natural gas of Ukraine versus Belarus consti-
tuted 55 versus USD 95 per thousand cubic metres (Balmaceda, 2014).
11. These revisions covered the time period of Armenia’s participation in the EaP (see below).
12. The price was lowered from USD 286 for thousand cubic metres in 2011 to 166 per thousand
cubic metres in 2012.
13. Being among the oldest ethnic civilisations, Armenia thrived as a kingdom in the 1st century
BC during the reign of Tigran the Great, then briefly in 1918–1920 as a part of the Transcau-
casian Democratic Federative Republic, afterwards of the Transcaucasian Federated Soviet
Socialist Republic and subsequently, as the ASSR.
14. The number of Armenians residing abroad surpasses the number of those in the country by
about twice.
15. The EU approach has differed from the approach of the US, which imposed negative condi-
tionality on Armenia (Vasilyan, 2010c).
16. This Programme covering travel, housing, job placement, among other factors was however
ceased in 2012 due to the concerns raised by the Armenian government reflecting the
public discontent over emigration (Hakobyan, 2012).
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17. The civic rallies carried out since November 2007 have been against potentially negative
environmental consequences of mining. The illegal construction in the Mashtotz Park in
Yerevan led to protests in February 2012. Further, rallies were held against the pension
reform in January 2014, demolition of buildings having historical significance in Yerevan in
June 2014, extradition of a Russian servicemen who murdered an Armenian family in
Gyumri in January 2015, the rise of public transport fares in June 2015, and the electricity
price hike in July 2015. A distinct kind of protest in the form of an armed occupation of a
police station took place in July 2016 (Vasilyan, 2016).
18. While Iran had been neutral vis-à-vis the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict due to its large Azeri
population, as well as its marginalisation owing to the Western sanctions, after the nuclear
deal reached through the Geneva process, Iran has become a more active regional player.
19. Subsequently, Brussels has reached out to the Belarusian civil society and the opposition, by
supporting media programmes, backing the opening of the Office for Democratic Belarus in
Brussels, sustaining the European Parliament’s Delegation for relations with Belarus (Vasilyan,
2018) and the support to the European Humanitarian University, which moved to Vilnius after
it was closed down in 2004 in Minsk.
20. This has allowed to classify Belarus’ relationship with Russia as ‘bandwagoning for profit’
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